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Thc view Tye criticizes in his rcview is the vicw I think one must hold if one thinks that the following is a possiblc case: (1) under the same circumstances, objcct X looks different to persons A and B with respect to color, and (2) neither A or B is mispcrceiving X. I take (1) and (2) to imply that X has two different properties, one perce~ved by A and onc perceived by B, and that it is X's (veridically) appearing to them to have these properties that constitutes its looking to them, with respect to color, the ways it does. It is thcse properties I have callcd "phenomenal propcrties," and hold to be dilferent from colors (thc objcct having only onc color). Thc phcnomenal character of cxpcrienccs, I claim, consists in its rcprcscnting such propcrtics.
The case of (1) and (2) I have focused on in prevlous discussions of this is thc hypothctical (and controvcrsial) casc of spectrum inversion. But we needn't assume the possibility of spectrum inversion in order to sec the need of an account that invokes such phenomenal properties. We need it, I think, in ordcr to account for actual differences between color perceivers. It is a fact that different peoplc often differ slightly in what lights, and what rcflectances, thcy pcrccivc as uniquc hues.' What onc person pcrccives as uniquc bluc another may perceive as a slightly greenish blue. This is due to slight differenccs in thc ways thcir visual systems process visual input. Whcre thcre is this sort of diffcrcncc bctwcen two pcoplc, thcrc is no basis on which one can say that onc of thcm sees the color of an object corrcctly and thc othcr is mispercciving it-nothing in the reflcctances, or in thc light, corrcsponds to the difference between uniquc and nonunique hues.' But the object does look diffcrcnt to them. Since they arc not mispcrcciving, thc objcct must have two different properties, onc vcridically perceived by one of them and thc othcr veridically perccivcd by thc othcr. And the only plausible candidates for thcse arc relational or dispositional propertics. Neither of thcsc properties is thc color, since they pcrccivc the same color.
Tye says that "distinguishing bctwcen the experienced character of a color and thc color itself effectively draws a vcil over the colors. Drawing this vcil is tantamount to erecting an appearance-reality distinction for the colors themselves." But to say that there is such an appearance-reality distinction suggests that thcrc is a unique way a color would look if one wcre perceiving it "as it is," and that in the casc just described at lcast onc of thc pcrccivers would bc misperceiving thc color that thcy pcrccive diffcrcntly. And of course my account denies this. Insofar as colors arc nonrclational propcrtics of objects, thcrc is no way a color looks simpliciter;thcrc arc only thc ways it looks to observers with visual systems of certain sorts. To a first approximation, an object's having a phenomenal color propcrty just is its looking a certain way to certain perccivcrs in virtuc of having a certain color, and this normally amounts to thc color of the object presenting itself in one of thc ways it can present itself. (I say "normally" to allow for the casc of color blindness.) So it is quite wrong to say, as Tyc does, that on this vicw the colors "arc not basically secn," and that thc relation of thc phcnomcnal propcrty to the color is analogous to that of thc facing surface of a tablc to the whole table. Nothing in thc account implies that it is cpistcmically possible, or even logically possible, that things should havc such phcnomcnal qualities without having colors.
Thcrc is no reason why this account cannot allow that a person misperceivcs an objcct as having a certain phenomenal property, in just the circumstances in which shc misperceives it as having the color which, having thc visual systcm she does, she perceives by perceiving that phenomenal propcrty. If in normal circumstanccs the person pcrccives thc members of a certain class of reflectanccs as uniquc blue, and owing to unusual illumination she pcrceivcs a membcr of this class as (say) green, thcn her perceptual expcricnce represents it as having both a phcnomcnal propcrty and a color that it docs not have.
Tyc mentions what had seemed to me the most counterintuitive conscqucnce of my account-that phcnomcnal propcrtics, being relational propcrtics things have in virtue of producing (in certain circumstanccs) cxpcricnces of certain sorts, arc possessed by objects only whcn thcy arc bcing pcrccivcd. The account would not havc this conscqucncc if it hcld that phenomenal properties are dispositional propcrtics. I had mistakenly thought that this is rulcd out. A givcn phcnomcnal propcrty cannot bc a disposition to produce an cxpericncc of a qualitative certain sort in all sorts of visual perceivers; therc are no such dispositions. And it cannot be a disposition to produce an cxpcri-cnce of a certain qualitative sort in perceivers having a visual systcm with a certain makeup-this would rule out the sort of spectrum inversion in which creature A perceives things of one color as having a certain phenomenal property and crcaturc B, having a somewhat different visual system, pcrccivcs things of a different color as having that same phenomenal property. But I overlookcd an obvious possibility. Each phenomenal propcrty could be defined, not as a disposition to producc a ccrtain sort of cxpcricnce in all visual perceivers, and not as a disposition to producc such cxpcricnccs in visual perccivcrs having a visual systcm with a ccrtain makeup, but as a disposition to produce such experiences in crcaturcs with visual systems of onc or more sorts. This pcrmits crcaturcs with differcnt visual system to pcrccivc thc samc phcnomenal properties. And it pcrmits objects to have phcnomcnal propcrtics at times when thcy are not observed. It still has one counterintuitive consequcnce: different phenomenal propcrtics, which cannot simultaneously be pcrccivcd by thc samc observer as belonging to thc same surface, can nevertheless bclong to the same surface, and it will not bc possiblc to pcrccive the absence of a phenomenal propcrty by perceiving the prcscncc of a different one. But the original version of my account had that consequence as wcll. Onc would of coursc likc an account which has no countcrintuitivc consequcnccs. But in thc casc of color perception therc is no chance of having that.
